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The Tribes Must Regulate: Jurisdictional,
Environmental, and Religious Considerations of
Hydraulic Fracturing on Tribal Lands
I. INTRODUCTION

Tex Hall, the chairman of the Three Affiliated Tribes, says that the
federal government must be prohibited from regulating hydraulic fracturing.
“If this is not done, our oil and gas production on our reservation will cease.
It’s that simple.” 1
A Blackfeet woman prepares to show a documentary film on the
environmental dangers of oil and gas drilling on the Blackfeet Reservation,
including impacts on air, water, and wildlife. “I guess you just have to weigh
[the promise of jobs created by oil and gas development] against the bigger
picture.” 2
Sacred sites are places where Native Americans can “channel the physical
and spiritual manifestations of their beliefs,” but when sacred sites are on
federal public lands, agency decisions can destroy the attributes which make
lands sacred, and thus, the ability of the people to practice their religions. 3 Not
all Indians agree that protection of sacred lands must prevail over economic
interests. When asked about tribal concerns over drilling for oil and gas on
sacred lands on the Blackfeet Reservation on the Rocky Mountain Front in
Montana, Ron Crossguns, an employee of the Blackfeet tribe’s oil and gas
department recently declared, “They’re just big rocks, nothing more. Don’t try
to make them into nothing holy. Jesus Christ put them there for animals to feed
on, and for people to hunt on.” 4

1. Eloise Ogden, Tex Hall: Proposed Fracking Regs Will Hurt Energy Development
MHA
NEWS
(Mar.
30,
2012),
Reservations ,
http://www.mhanation.com/main2/Home_News/Home_News_2012/News_2012_03_March/news_20
12_march30.html.
2. Dan Testa, ‘Fracking’ Ramps Up on Blackfeet Reservation , F LATHEAD BEACON
(Aug. 17, 2011), http://www.flatheadbeacon.com/articles/article/fracking_ramps_up_on_
blackfeet_reservation/24296.
3. Joel Brady, “Land Is Itself a Sacred Living Being”: Native American Sacred Site Protection on
Federal Public Lands Amidst the Shadows of Bear Lodge, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153, 156 (1999–
2000).
4. Jack Healy, Tapping Into the Land, and Dividing Its People, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 15, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/us/montana-tribe-divided-on-tapping-oil-richland.html?pagewanted=all.
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Tribal lands are a potentially lucrative source of energy and
economic resources, but they are largely undeveloped, 5 and many
tribes remain “resource-rich and cash-poor.” 6 According to the most
recent analysis, Indian lands account for a little more than 1% of
total natural gas production, 2.5% of total natural gas plant liquids
production, less than 1% of sales of total crude oil production, and
2% of total coal production in the United States—statistics which
consider state, Indian, federal onshore, and federal offshore lands. 7
Thus, there is much opportunity for growth; Indian lands constitute
only 5% of total land area in the country,8 but experts estimate that
up to 10% of the nation’s untapped energy resources lie on or under
these lands. 9
A complex relationship with the federal government, which
regulates oil and gas production on tribal lands, are the tribes’ most
significant hindrance to energy development. The federal
government imposes a complex, lengthy, and expensive procedure
on those who wish to lease tribal lands, whereas states impose

5. Elizabeth Ann Kronk, Tribal Energy Resource Agreements: The Unintended “Great Mischief
for Indian Energy Development” and the Resulting Need for Reform, 29 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 811, 813
n.11 (2012).
6. John Kemp, Tribes Call for Faster Drilling on Indian Lands, REUTERS (Feb. 5, 2013,
10:03 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/05/column-kemp-oilgas-indian-landsidUSL5N0B5A9W20130205.
7. The statistics quoted above were derived from tables published by the United States
Energy Information Administration. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SALES OF FOSSIL FUELS
PRODUCED FROM FEDERAL AND INDIAN LANDS, FY 2003 THROUGH FY 2011,. app. A, (2012),
available at http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/federallands/pdf/eia-federallandsales.pdf, for
more information on fossil fuel sales from Indian lands, onshore federal lands, and offshore
federal lands. Indian lands account for 5% of natural gas production, 3% of natural gas plant
liquid production, 3% of crude oil production, and 5% of coal production on federal and Indian
lands. Id. at 3–5. However, these statistics are a little deceptive when considering total national
production, because federal and Indian lands account for only 32.3%, or 18,596 trillion BTUs, of
total fossil fuel production in the United States. Those statistics do not consider state lands,
where most fossil fuel production takes place. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN, MONTHLY ENERGY
REV., 5 (2013), available at http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/pdf/mer.pdf, for
reports on total fossil fuel production in the United States. In 2011, there were 60,583 trillion
BTUs of fossil fuels produced on Indian, federal, and state lands, combined.
8. Kronk, supra note 5, at 814.
9. Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska Native Affairs, NAT. RESOURCES COMMITTEE,
available at http://naturalresources.house.gov/subcommittees/subcommittee/?SubcommitteeID
=5066 (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
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comparatively few restrictions. 10 By illustration, a Ute tribal
representative explains that the Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”), the federal agency regulating oil and gas leases on Indian
lands, requires a forty-nine step process to approve a single well,
completion of which can take anywhere from ninety to 480 days.11
By contrast, it takes ten days to receive a permit to drill on North
Dakota state lands, fourteen days in Ohio, and twenty-seven in
Colorado. 12 Additionally, the costs are higher for tribes than for
states; BLM charges $6,500 for each application—in contrast,
Montana charges just $75. 13 The complex application process and
high fees result in companies preferring to drill on private or stateowned lands instead of on Indian lands, eliminating tribes’
opportunities to participate in the oil and gas boom caused by
advancements in fracking technology. 14
Thus, oil- and gas-producing tribes have greater obstacles to
developing their resources than states and other entities, but the
disparity has recently expanded with the rising popularity of a new
extraction method—hydraulic fracturing. Hydraulic fracturing, or
fracking, is a process of extracting oil, gas, or geothermal energy by
horizontally pumping fluids, commonly water and additives, into
rock at high pressures. 15 The fluids open or enlarge fractures in the
rock, allowing minerals to flow freely from the tight rock into
production wells on the surface. 16 The pressure of the geologic
formation causes the fluids to rise to the surface where it is
disposed, recycled, or re-injected into the ground. 17 Fracking is
“absolutely necessary to profitably develop oil and gas from shale

10. See infra Part II.
11. Kemp, supra note 6.
12. U.S. Oil Production Up, But on Whose Lands?, INST. FOR ENERGY RES. (Sept. 24, 2012),
http://www.instituteforenergyresearch.org/2012/09/24/u-s-oil-production-up-but-on-whoselands-2/.
13. Kemp, supra note 6.
14. Id.
15. See, e.g., Thomas Swartz, Hydraulic Fracturing: Risks and Risk Management, 26 NAT.
RESOURCESS & ENV’T 30, 30 (2011).
16. Hydraulic Fracturing Background Information, E.P.A., http://water.epa.gov/type/
groundwater/uic/class2/hydraulicfracturing/wells_hydrowhat.cfm (last visited Oct. 29, 2012).
17. Id.
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rock formations” 18 because otherwise, natural resources are too
difficult to extract from the tight rock.
Unconventional drilling techniques such as fracking can
potentially make the United States a net exporter of energy. 19 For
instance, the nation is sitting on top of a one hundred year supply of
natural gas, which will increase domestic energy supplies, reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce dependence on foreign energy
sources. 20 Fracking has led to prosperity in states such as North
Dakota, where fracking has spurred an oil boom, giving North
Dakota the lowest unemployment rate in the country. 21 Tribes can
potentially share in these economic successes. For example, the
Blackfeet in northern Montana is a tribe with oil and gas reserves
under their reservation. Until about five years ago, it was generally
believed that the reservation did not hold enough resources to make
drilling profitable,22 however, fracking is expected to change that. So
far, drilling on the reservation has been exploratory, meaning that no
oil has been extracted yet, 23 but the eastern part of the reservation
lies on top of the profitable Bakken shale formation. 24 It is estimated
that there are 3.65 billion barrels of undiscovered oil in the Williston
Basin in the Bakken shale, and while it is unknown how much oil
and gas lie underneath the Blackfeet Reservation itself, energy may
hold the key to economic development on the reservation. 25

18. David E. Pierce, Developing a Common Law of Hydraulic Fracturing, 72 U. PITT. L. REV.
685, 685 (2011).
19. Patti Domm, US is on Fast-Track to Energy Independence: Study, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.cnbc.com/id/100450133.
20. Terry W. Roberson, Environmental Concerns of Hydraulically Fracturing a Natural Gas
Well, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 67, 68 (2012).
21. See, e.g., Matthew Rocco, North Dakota Oil Boom Driving Economic Development, FOX
BUS. (Feb. 11, 2013), http://www.foxbusiness.com/economy/2013/02/11/north-dakota-oilboom-driving-economic-development/.
22. Tom Fredericks & Andrea Aseff, When Did Congress Deem Indian Lands Public Lands?:
The Problem of BLM Exercising Oil and Gas Regulatory Jurisdiction in Indian Country, 33 ENERGY L.J.
119, 121 (2002).
23. Testa, supra note 2.
24. Interest Grows in Oil, Gas on Mont. Reservation, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 12, 2011),
http://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/interest-grows-in-oil-gas-onmontana-reservation/article_eb0284f8-c53d-11e0-9ebf-001cc4c03286.html.
25. Id.
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For many impoverished tribes, development of natural resources
can be a lifeline. As just one example of the economies of tribes, the
unemployment rate on the Blackfeet reservation is close to 70%. 26
Energy production is a potential avenue for tribes to decrease
unemployment and alleviate poverty. It will give tribes an
opportunity to diversify their economies, generate revenue, and
create jobs. 27 It can also fulfill tribes’ own energy needs on the
reservation. 28 Further, this will allow tribes to exercise increased
sovereignty by having more control over land use decisions on the
reservation; 29 they will be able to make decisions aligned with their
environmental and religious needs.
However, none of these benefits can be fully realized as long as
the federal government imposes complex bureaucratic regulations on
those who wish to drill on tribal lands. An ill-conceived new
proposal to increase federal oversight over fracking will hinder
energy development on tribal lands. On May 11, 2012, BLM
proposed a rule (“proposed BLM rule”) that would require disclosure
of chemicals used in fracking on public and Indian lands. 30 The
proposed rule would require (1) the public disclosure of all the
chemicals used in fracking operations on federal and tribal lands, (2)
confirmation that wells used in fracturing operations meet
appropriate construction standards, and (3) a requirement that
operators put in place appropriate plans for managing flowback 31
waters from fracking operations. 32
This proposed rule must be rewritten to exempt Indian lands,
and instead, the federal government must empower tribes to
regulate fracking for the following three reasons which will be
explored in this Comment: (1) it undermines current theories on the
relationship between the United States government and tribes, and

26.
27.
28.
29.

Testa, supra note 2.
Kronk, supra note 5, at 840.
Id. at 841.
Heather J. Tanana & John C. Ruple, Energy Development in Indian Country: Working
Within the Realm of Indian Law and Moving Towards Collaboration, 32 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 2
(2012).
30. Oil and Gas; Well Stimulation, Including Hydraulic Fracturing on Federal and Indian
Lands, 43 Fed. Reg. 3160 (May 5, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-0511/pdf/2012-11304.pdf.
31. EPA, supra note 16. Flowback waters are the injected fluids that rise to the surface
once oil and gas are extracted from rock. They commonly consist of water and chemicals.
32. 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2010).
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is thus, improper, (2) federal agencies are ill-equipped to handle
environmental regulation on tribal lands, and (3) tribes better
understand religious concerns of fracking on tribal lands. This
solution is consistent with congressional policies of increasing tribes’
abilities to govern themselves, will ensure that the environment is
properly regulated on reservations, and will more properly ensure
the protection of sacred sites that may be impacted by fracking. Part
II of this Comment begins by explaining the trust relationship
between the federal government and Indian tribes and explains why
it contributes to minimal oil and gas production on tribal lands. Part
III lists some of the environmental laws that affect oil and gas
development and how they are enforced on tribal lands, ultimately
concluding that on tribal lands, these laws have been ineffective. Part
IV adds one more dimension—when lands held sacred by Native
American are destroyed, the end result can be devastating to Indian
culture and religion. Part V concludes, reinforcing the Comment’s
central thesis that instead of adding regulatory burdens to tribes, the
federal government should fund tribes so that they can set up their
own fracking rules. This way, Congress can bolster tribal sovereignty
and tribes can regulate fracking in ways that would remain sensitive
to their religious and environmental needs.
II. JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS OF FRACKING ON TRIBAL LANDS
When Tex Hall, chairman of the Three Affiliated Tribes, said that
oil and gas production will cease on his reservation if the federal
government regulated fracking, 33 he emphasized that federal
regulation would result in even more bureaucratic hurdles for
prospective lessees on tribal lands. A complex trust relationship
between tribes and the federal government imposes many
bureaucratic hurdles on those who wish to extract minerals on tribal
lands. However, the federal government’s recent movement towards
allowing tribes self-determination and self-governance should ease
the burdens associated with the trust relationship. The proposed
BLM rule halts recent efforts to realize these effects and therefore
should not be adopted. Part II.A will explain the trust relationship
and the doctrines of tribal self-determination and self-governance,
ultimately arguing that tribes must be empowered to have increased

33. See supra Part I.
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authority over oil and gas leasing on their lands. This Part will also
outline relevant federal statutes and their shortcomings in
empowering tribes to control their resources. Part II.B will argue
that fracking on tribal lands should not be federally regulated
because tribal regulation is desirable for practical reasons and
because federal regulation of fracking flies in the face of Congress’s
intent to encourage self-governance by tribes.

A. Tribal-Federal Trust Relationship Inhibits Development of Natural
Resources
The complex relationship between the federal government and
Indian tribes has resulted in an even more complex division of
authority in oil and gas regulation on tribal lands. 34 It is imperative
to determine ownership of mineral resources in order to understand
who can regulate on tribal lands. 35 There are three major categories
of land ownership on reservations. They can be: 1) held in fee by
Indian tribes, 2) held in fee by non-Indians, or 3) held in trust by the
federal government. Each of these lands is regulated differently, and
the history of Indian lands will help clarify the distinctions.

1. Three types of land ownership on reservations
Early in the nation’s formation, official policy was focused on
moving tribes westward to make room for white settlement. 36 In the
middle of the nineteenth century, the focus shifted to reserving areas
for tribes, which became known as “reservations.” 37 The
reservations remained the official policy until 1887, when Congress
passed the General Allotment Act, dissolving the reservation system
and granting individual Native Americans parcels of land. 38 The
allotment policy was a disaster for Indians because white settlers,
taking advantage of Indians’ lack of knowledge about land

34. Tribal
Law,
INTERMOUNTAIN
OIL
&
GAS
BMP
PROJECT,
http://www.oilandgasbmps.org/laws/tribal/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2013).
35. Id.
36. Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian County: The Evolution of Tribal Control
Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 545 (1994).
37. Id. at 546.
38. Alexis E. Applegate, Note, Tribal Authority to Zone Nonmember Fee Land Using the First
Montana Exception: A Game of Checkers Tribes Can Win, 40 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 159, 160
(2013).
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ownership, purchased former reservation land en masse. 39 In 1934,
the allotment period officially ended, and Congress created new
reservations for tribes that had lost their land, added land to
reservations that were still intact after white settlement, and
restored tribal ownership to lands which had not been sold off to
white settlers.40 In 1953, the government changed its stance once
again by eliminating reservations, though they were reinstated in
1968.41
As a result of the allotment policy, approximately two-thirds of
the total lands allotted were transferred from Indian hands to nonIndian settlers. 42 The modern-day result of the allotment policy is a
“checkerboard of land ownership between tribal land and
nonmember lands,” 43 as non-Indian fee lands are interspersed
between Indian fee lands and trust lands. Mineral rights to these
lands depend on the specific allotment. 44 Some allottees acquired all
surface and subsurface rights, while others’ subsurface rights were
contingent on congressional control. 45
However, only a small percentage of tribal lands are owned in fee
by either Indians or non-Indians. 46 Most lands on reservations are
held in fee by the United States, which takes title to the land in trust
for the tribe that occupies the area. 47 This Comment will limit its
scope to lands held in trust because trust lands make up the majority
of Indian lands where fracking is an issue—although distinctions
between fee lands and trust lands will be discussed where the
distinctions are relevant. The foundations of the trust relationship
were laid out in two nineteenth century cases: Cherokee Nation v.

39. Id.
40. Id. at 166.
41. Id.
42. Royster, supra note 36, at 550.
43. Applegate, supra note 38, at 160.
44. Royster, supra note 36, at 548–49.
45. Id.
46. GEORGE RUSSELL, THE AMERICAN INDIAN DIGEST, D-1 (1993), available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/people/tribal/tribexd.pdf. From the 55 million acres of federally
recognized Indian reservations, 44 million are tribal trust lands, and 11 million are held in fee.
Some reservations are totally tribal trust lands, and others are owned entirely by individuals. For
example, the Navajo reservation encompassing Utah, Arizona, and New Mexico is 95% trust
lands and the Uintah reservation in Utah is 99% trust lands, but the Blackfeet reservation in
Montana is 32% trust lands.
47. Royster, supra note 36, at 546.
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Georgia 48 and Worcester v. Georgia.49 In Cherokee Nation, the Supreme
Court held that the Indian tribes were not foreign states within the
meaning of the constitution, 50 but rather, “domestic dependent
nations” 51 that have an “unquestionable . . . right to the lands they
occupy.” 52 They have a relationship with the United States
resembling a “ward to his guardian.” 53 One year later, in Worcester v.
Georgia, the Court held that state laws have no bearing on Indian
lands, and that “[t]he whole intercourse between the United States
and this [Indian] nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in
the government of the United States.” 54
Cherokee Nation and Worcester taken together stand for the
proposition that the federal government, and not state governments,
owes Indian tribes external protection. 55 This external protection is
a trust relationship provided in the Indian General Allotment Act:
“The United States does and will hold the land thus allotted . . . in
trust for the sole use and benefit of the Indian to whom such
allotment shall have been made.” 56 The trust relationship includes
“a special government-to-government relationship with Indian
tribes, including the right of the tribes to self-governance.” 57 As
domestic dependent nations, Indian tribes possess all the aspects of
sovereignty unless Congress uses its plenary powers to take this
sovereignty away by a treaty or an Act of Congress. 58
The trust relationship has been used to justify both the federal
government’s preferential treatment of tribes and its overbearing and
paternalistic treatment of Indians. 59 Because the federal government
acts as a trustee, it has extensive control over natural resources on

48. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
49. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
50. 30 U.S. at 8.
51. Id at 17.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Worcester, 31 U.S. at 520.
55. Kronk, supra note 5, at 825.
56. 25 U.S.C. § 331 (2006).
57. Indian Self-Determination Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-413, 108 Stat. 4250, 4270–77
(1994).
58. United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131 S. Ct. 2313, 2324 (2011); United States
v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
59. Brett J. Stavin, Comment, Responsible Remedies: Suggestions for Indian Tribes in Trust
Relationship Cases, 44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1743, 1743 (2012).
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tribal lands. 60 Sometimes, in carrying out its fiduciary duties, the
government has acted with carelessness or in bad faith. 61 The
Supreme Court evaluated whether there is a cause of action against
the government for violating its trust duties and has come up with
somewhat of a bright-line rule, which reflects a gradual diminution
of the government’s fiduciary obligations to Indian tribes. 62 In United
States v. Mitchell, the Court held that a general statute, such as the
Indian General Allotment Act, established merely a “bare trust”
relationship, and the United States has no affirmative duty to
manage coal leasing to the benefit of the tribes. 63 However, if the
United States assumes “elaborate control over [natural resources]
and property belonging to Indians” under a more specific statute,
then “a fiduciary relationship necessarily arises” that is enforceable
by an award of damages. 64

2. Regulation of minerals on tribal lands
The proper regulatory authority for mineral rights depends on
whether the reservation land is held in fee by Indians, by nonIndians, or in trust. In general, tribes have the sole authority to lease
mineral rights on lands that they own in fee because Indian lands are
not public lands that normally would be controlled by the federal
government under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. 65 Tribes may
exercise authority over non-Indians living on fee lands only when
non-Indian conduct threatens or has direct effect on tribal sovereign
interests or if non-Indians enter consensual contracts or leases with
tribes.66 Tribes have no jurisdiction over land held in fee by nonIndians. 67
Surface mineral rights on lands held in trust are regulated by the
Department of the Interior, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs,

60. Id.
61. Id. at 1744.
62. Id. at 1761–65.
63. United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 224 (1983) (construing United States v.
Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980)).
64. Id. at 225.
65. Tanana & Ruple, supra note 29, at 35. See 30 U.S.C. § 226 (2012). The Mineral
Leasing Act states that “[a]ll [federal] lands . . . which are known or believed to contain oil or
gas deposits may be leased by the Secretary.” Id.
66. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981).
67. Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 544 U.S. 316, 338 (2008).
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and subsurface rights are regulated by the BLM. 68 Regulations for
onshore oil and gas operations for lands held in trust are outlined in
the Code of Federal Regulations 69 and include regulations
promulgated from federal statutes relevant to Indian tribes such as
the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 70 the Federal Oil and Gas
Royalty Management Act, 71 and the Indian Mineral Development
Act of 1982. 72

3. Federal statutes regulating oil and gas leasing on tribal lands are largely
ineffective
Recently, Congress has tried to enact laws which give tribes
more regulatory authority over mineral rights on their lands. These
efforts are part of a broader congressional policy of tribal selfdetermination, a concept that was initiated in the late 1960s. 73 This
policy encourages self-governance and has been manifested in laws
such as the Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975, a statute that
provides tribes with federal funding to administer government
services to their members. 74 Self-determination and self-governance
remain the official policies of Congress, and today, a large portion of
federal appropriations for tribal programs are distributed to the
tribes to administer such programs on their own. 75
Despite Congress’ policy of self-determination, tribes have
inadequate control over their natural resource development,
especially in relation to fracking. In 2005, Congress passed Title

68. Fredericks & Aseff, supra note 22, at 123.
69. 43 C.F.R. § 3160 (2010). available at http://www.ecfr.gov/cgi-bin/textidx?c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title43/43cfr3160_main_02.tpl.
70. 25 U.S.C. § 396(a) (2006) (“[U]nallotted lands within any Indian reservation . . .
may, with the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, be leased for mining purposes.”).
71. 30 U.S.C. § 1701(b)(2) (2012) (“It is the purpose of this chapter . . . to clarify,
reaffirm, expand and define the authorities and responsibilities of the Secretary of the Interior to
implement and maintain a royalty management system for oil and gas leases on . . . Indian
lands.”).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 2102 (“Any Indian tribe, subject to the approval of the Secretary . . .
may enter into any joint venture, operating, production sharing, service, managerial, lease or
other modification of such agreement . . . providing for the exploration for, or extraction,
processing, or other development of, oil, gas . . . .”).
73. Kevin K. Washburn, Tribal Self-Determination at the Crossroads, 38 CONN. L. REV. 777,
779 (2006).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 780–81.
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XXVI to the 2005 Amendments to the Energy Policy Act of 1992, 76
which established the Indian Energy Resource Development
Program. 77 The purposes of the program are to “assist Indian tribes
in the development of energy resources and further the goal of
Indian self-determination.” 78 The Secretary of the Interior
accomplishes these purposes by providing grants “for use in
developing or obtaining the managerial and technical capacity
needed to develop energy resources on Indian land,” 79 “for use in
carrying out projects to promote the integration of energy
resources,” 80 and “to establish a national resource center to develop
tribal capacity to establish and carry out tribal environmental
programs in support of energy-related programs and activities.” 81
The Secretary also provides low-interest loans “for the promotion of
energy resource development on Indian land.” 82
Most importantly, the Amendments established the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-Determination Act (“ITEDSA”), which
eliminates Secretarial approval for leases. 83 Tribes must enter into a
Tribal Energy Resource Agreement (“TERA”) with the Secretary of
the Interior in order to qualify. 84 The Secretary must approve the
TERA and ensure that tribes have a comprehensive environmental
regulatory scheme similar to the National Environmental Policy Act,
which does not apply to Indian lands. 85
However, ITEDSA has yet to encourage tribal self-determination.
As of yet, no tribes have taken advantage of ITEDSA. There are a few
possible explanations for this. One explanation is that the Secretary
of the Interior will only approve a TERA if the tribe meets several
prerequisites, such as establishing requirements for environmental
review that mirror the rather cumbersome requirements of the
National Environmental Policy Act. 86 Another explanation is that

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

738

42 U.S.C. §§ 13201–13574.
25 U.S.C. §§ 3501–3506.
25 U.S.C. § 3502(a)(1).
Id. § 3502(a)(2)(A).
Id. § 3502(a)(2)(B).
Id. § 3502(a)(2)(D).
Id. § 3502(a)(2)(C).
Id. § 3504.

Id.
Kronk, supra note 5, at 817.

Id.
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ITEDSA holds that “the United States shall not be liable to any party
(including any Indian tribe) for any negotiated term of, or any loss
resulting from the negotiated terms of, a lease, business agreement,
or right-of-way executed pursuant to and in accordance with a
[TERA].” 87 In other words, tribes can be sued by outside parties
regarding mineral leases. This is unattractive to tribes, who believe,
in the words of a Southern Ute attorney, that opening up tribal
decisions to citizen suits will contradict “[t]raditional notions of
tribal sovereignty [that] protect tribes from incursion of . . . nonmembers in the decisionmaking process.” 88 Finally, another
explanation includes claims that Indian tribes do not have sufficient
money or expertise to enter into TERAs. 89 While the statute directs
the Secretary to provide development grants to tribes, the way it
stands now, the grants may not be enough to overcome lack of
financing. 90
Congress is aware of the problems associated with ITEDSA and
has made several proposals to ease the burdens of TERAs. The
Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible Tribal Homeownership
Act of 2012,91 which was signed into law by President Obama in late
July 2012, 92 is intended to expedite the leasing of certain lands
without Secretarial approval or TERAs—but it excepts “a lease for
the exploration, development, or extraction of any mineral
resources.” 93 Thus, it does not apply to fracking of oil and natural
gas. 94 In September 2012, the ITEDSA Amendments of 2012 were
passed by the Senate’s Indian Affairs Committee. 95 These

87. 25 U.S.C. § 3504.
88. Kronk, supra note 5, at 831.
89. Benjamin J. Fosland, A Case of Not-So-Fatal Flaws: Re-evaluating the Indian Tribal
Energy Development and Self-determination Act, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 447, 454 (2012).
90. Id.
91. H.R. 205, 112th Cong. (2012).
92. Jodi Gillette, Strengthening Tribal Communities Through the HEARTH Act,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(July
30,
2012),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/07/30/
strengthening-tribal-communities-through-hearth-act.
93. H.R. 205 (h)(1), 112th Cong. (2012) (enacted).
94. See Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the Problem of the
Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 98 (2012) (“Congress has consistently been
explicit that all fossil fuels are included within the mineral development statutes, and a statutory
definition trumps a scientific definition for purposes of law. Consequently, the term “mineral” in
Indian law is routinely used to include oil and natural gas.”).
95. Adam Voge, Indian Energy Bill, Introduced by Wyoming Senator, Heads to Senate, STARTRIB. (Sept. 19, 2012), http://trib.com/business/energy/indian-energy-bill-introduced-by-
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amendments would allow for certain actions to be excluded from
environmental reviews and provides that tribes do not necessarily
need to have sufficient capacity to develop resources to qualify for a
TERA. 96 It also puts the burden on the Secretary to explain why a
TERA was denied. 97 The bill is still waiting for approval from the
Senate. 98

B. Federal Regulation of Fracking is Improper
The proposed BLM rule is the most recent legislation dealing
with tribal energy development. While Congress has attempted—
albeit unsuccessfully—to increase tribal self-determination and selfgovernance, the proposed BLM rule is one large step backwards as it
will impose more burdensome federal regulations in a time when
tribes should be empowered to make more decisions about energy
development on their land. By imposing more bureaucratic red tape,
the federal government is effectively discouraging natural resource
development on tribal lands. Empowering tribes to manage fracking
locally is not an anomaly; in fact, fracking is currently regulated at
the state and municipal level. This system is desirable, and its
reasoning should be applied to tribal regulation on their lands.
Additionally, the proposed BLM rule improperly ignores tribal selfgovernance.

1. Local fracking regulations are desirable to federal regulations
Fracking regulation is complicated and is regulated by federal,
state, and local governments. Currently, states bear most of the
burden of regulation—and rightfully so. The reason why the federal
government does not regulate fracking extensively is because the
major federal environmental statutes, for example, the Safe Drinking
Water Act (“SDWA”),99 Clean Water Act (“CWA”), 100 Clean Air
Act (“CAA”), 101 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

wyoming-senator-heads-to-senate/article_143ded55-e0c9-5296-bfed-f38ca6a26e6c.html.
96. Royster, supra note 94, at 126.
97. Id. at 127.
98. Voge, supra note 95.
99. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f–300j(26) (2012).
100. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1–3857.
101. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671(q).
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(“RCRA”), 102 and Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) 103 all provide key
exemptions for fracking, although the SDWA and the CWA regulate
fracking to a limited extent. In 2005, Congress passed the Energy
Policy Act of 2005, which limited the SDWA to apply only to
fracking operations where diesel fuels are used—which is quite
uncommon. 104 Similarly, federal regulation under the CWA is
limited; it applies mostly to the disposal of fracking wastewater,
which has a high concentration of dissolved solids and chemicals,
into treatment works that flow into navigable waters. 105
In the absence of federal agency authority, states have assumed
the responsibility of regulating fracking within their borders. 106
When there are gaps in state regulation, municipal governments set
up their own regulations. 107 However, many people and
organizations, such as environmental groups, have been urging for
an increased role for the federal government. 108 For example, ever
since the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, environmental
groups have lobbied for the passage of the Fracturing Responsibility
and Awareness of Chemicals Act of 2011 (the “Frac Act”), which
would repeal the fracking exception in SDWA and require fracking
operators to disclose fracking chemicals.109 Many environmentalists
urge increased federal regulations because of states’ perceived
“nonchalant attitude[s] towards environmental concerns.” 110
Despite the Blackfeet Department of Commerce’s claim that
“[h]orizontal drilling is very environmentally friendly,” 111 there are

102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992(k).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75.
104. Rebecca Jo Reser, State and Federal Statutory and Regulatory Treatment of Hydraulic
Fracturing, 80 DEF. COUNS. J. 90, 97 (2013).
105. Id. at 98–99.
106. Robert H. Freilich & Neil M. Popowitz, Oil and Gas Fracking: State and Federal
Regulation Does Not Preempt Needed Local Government Regulation, 44 URB. LAW. 533, 540 (2012).
107. Id.
108. Reser, supra note 104, at 100.
109. Id.
110. Heather Ash, Note, EPA Launches Hydraulic Fracturing Study to Investigate Health and
Environmental Concerns While North Dakota Resists Regulation: Should Citizens Be Concerned? 87 N.D.
L. REV. 717, 733 (2011).
111. Frequently
Asked
Questions
Oil
and
Gas,
BLACKFEET
DEP’T
COM.,
http://www.blackfeetcommerce.com/faqs_oil.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2012).
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many who disagree. The most frequent complaint is water
contamination. Most fracking fluid remains underground, and those
living above shale reserves have noticed cloudy, smelly, and
flammable drinking water. 112 Other problems include wastewater
treatment and storage, chemical spills, air and noise pollution,
monitoring and enforcement of best practices, and degradation and
fragmentation of wildlife habitats. 113
There are also fears of little-understood effects of fracking fluids
and subsurface geology. 114 Earthquakes are on the rise; seismic
events in the middle of the country averaged twenty-one per year
from 1970-2000, then jumped to 50 in 2009, 87 in 2010, and 134 in
2011.115 The U.S. Geological Survey (“USGS”) stated that these
earthquakes are “almost certainly man-made, and may be caused by
wastewater from oil or gas drilling injected into the ground.” 116
However, even the USGS acknowledges that there is no proof of a
direct causation between the two. 117 Additionally, all the
earthquakes so far have been low-magnitude and have been smaller
than earthquakes caused by other projects such as the building of
dams and geothermal projects. 118
The fracking debate is frustrating because a lot of the “facts”
promulgated by both sides are hyperbole or simply guesses. A 2010
documentary, Gasland, has been credited for catalyzing national
activism against fracking. 119 The film, which has scenes of
Pennsylvania residents who are able to light their drinking water on

112. Zachary Lees, Anticipated Harm, Precautionary Regulation and Hydraulic Fracturing, 13
VT. J. ENVTL. L. 575, 582 (2012).
113. Id. at 583.
114. Id.
115. Mark Drajem, Fracking Tied to Unusual Ride in Earthquakes in U.S., BLOOMBERG.COM
(Apr. 12, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-12/earthquake-outbreakin-central-u-s-tied-to-drilling-wastewater.html.
116. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Matt Smith & Thom Patterson, Debate over Fracking, Quakes Get Louder, CNN.COM
(June
15,
2012,
3:28
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/15/us/frackingearthquakes/index.html.
118. Christopher Helman, Should We Freak Out About Fracking-Induced Earthquakes?,
FORBES.COM (Jan. 10, 2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherhelman/
2012/01/10/should-we-freak-out-about-fracking-induced-earthquakes/2/.
119. Jefferson Dodge, ‘Gasland’ Filmmaker to Speak at Local Anti-fracking Event, BOULDER
WEEKLY (Nov. 29, 2012), http://www.boulderweekly.com/article-10237-gasland-filmmaker-tospeak-at-local-anti-fracking-event.html.
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fire and purports to “uncover[] a trail of secrets, lies and
contamination” 120 has been accused of misstating the law and the
process and falsifying information. 121 With so few scientific facts, it
is difficult to determine the true impacts of fracking. The EPA will
hopefully dispel some myths in a comprehensive study of the effects
of fracking, due to be released for public comment and peer review in
2014.122
In the meantime, there is no reason why the federal government
should step in to regulate fracking. The BLM proposed rule, and any
federal legislation proposing to increase federal authority over
fracking, “hews to the precautionary principle of regulating under
scientific uncertainty.” 123 The precautionary principle suggests that
regulators should anticipate environmental harm, and rather than
await scientific certainty, they should act to ensure that the harm
will not occur. 124 Usually environmental laws weigh caution against
risk, 125 both of which assume that there is sufficient knowledge to
understand the risks and the appropriate benefits. 126 With such a
lack of scientific knowledge about fracking, it is almost impossible to
know what level of environmental regulation is reasonable. 127
However, in this case, there is a high risk of overregulation,
especially since there are many myths about the true environmental
impacts of fracking. In fact, there is almost no knowledge about the
true risks of the practice. Especially when the economic rewards of
fracking are so great, the risks of overregulation can be
devastating, 128 especially to tribes. Compliance with the proposed

120. GASLAND, http://www.gaslandthemovie.com/about-the-film (last visited Nov. 30,
2012).
121. DEBUNKING GASLAND, http://www.energyindepth.org/debunking-gasland/ (last
visited Nov. 30, 2012).
122. Study of Hydraulic Fracturing and Its Potential Impact on Drinking Water Resources,
EPA.GOV (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.epa.gov/hfstudy/.
123. Joseph A. Dammel, Note, Notes from Underground: Hydraulic Fracturing in the Marcellus
Shale, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 773, 804 (2011).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. INTERPRETING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 205 (Timothy O’Riordan & James
Cameron, eds., 1994).
127. Id. at 206.
128. One recent example of overregulation in the oil and gas industry is the six-month
drilling moratorium that was recommended by the Obama Administration after the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill. It costs thousands of jobs and caused severe economic harm in the Gulf of
Mexico region. See, e.g., Oversight: Obama Admin. Decision to Include Gulf Drilling Moratorium in DOI
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BLM rule will be prohibitively expensive for many tribes. The
Western Energy Alliance estimated that the cost for new permits and
workovers could range from $1.499 billion to $1.615 billion
annually. 129 This money will divert resources away from energy
development, job creation, and economic growth in states and on
tribal lands. 130 Even more detrimental for Indian tribes is the delay
caused by permits and paperwork. This, in turn, leads to significant
costs for operators and investors, precluding them from developing
additional resources on impacted land. 131
Moreover, state, local, and tribal fracking regulations are simply
more desirable to federal regulation. The president of the
Independent Petroleum Association of America pointed out that the
federal regulations would mandate a one-size-fits-all rule on fracking
operations, which is illogical. 132 Oil and gas deposits and water
tables are found at different depths, and surface characteristics are
different depending on the formation. 133 Such geographic
characteristics of oil and gas reserves vary from state to state, and
state officials are more knowledgeable about local and regional
production techniques than federal agencies. 134 On-the-ground
knowledge leads to more effective regulation—regulation that is
more specifically tailored to the characteristics of reserves in the
location. 135 Because state officials are politically accountable to local
residents, they will likely be more receptive to local concerns. 136
Similar to state officials, tribal leaders are armed with more
information about the true significance of a site, the environmental
impacts noticed over time, and the economic needs of a tribe. The
Report, NAT’L RES COMM., http://naturalresources.house.gov/oversight/moratorium/ (last
updated Aug. 1, 2012).
129. Karen Boman, Study: Fracking Rule on Federal, Indian Lands Could Cost More Than $1.6B,
RIGZONE (June 12, 2012), http://www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=118546.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. John M. Broder, New Proposal on Fracking Gives Ground to Industry, N.Y. TIMES (May 4,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/05/us/new-fracking-rule-is-issued-by-obamaadministration.html?_r=0.
133. Marin Katusa, Another Layer of Bureaucracy for Oil and Gas Exploration in the US?, 321
ENERGY (Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.321energy.com/editorials/casey/casey110712.html.
134. Matt Willie, Comment, Hydraulic Fracturing and “Spotty” Regulation: Why the Federal
Government Should Let States Control Unconventional Onshore Drilling, 2011 BYU L. REV. 1743,
1772.
135. Id. at 1773.
136. Id.
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environmental and social costs of fracking on tribal lands differ from
tribe to tribe—and often within each tribe. For example, while many
tribal leaders support fracking, there has been solid opposition by
those who worry about both religious and environmental
consequences. On the Blackfeet reservation, both the Waters of the
Blackfeet 137 and the Blackfeet Anti-Fracking Coalition 138 host
Facebook pages with information about the dangers of fracking,
updates on fracking operations on tribal lands, and details about
events and meetings. Opinions on fracking on Indian lands are
hardly uniform, although it is paternalistic to believe that tribes will
not be able to resolve these conflicts without the federal
government. In the words of the chairman of the University of
Montana’s Native American Studies program, tribes are more
sensitive to the need to “balance environmental protection, cultural
preservation and economic development” when it comes to
fracking. 139

2. The proposed BLM rule improperly ignores the doctrine of selfdetermination
Many tribal representatives commented during the note-andcomment period of the proposed rule that increased federal
regulation violates tribal sovereignty because Indian lands are not
public lands.140 In the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 141
Congress charged the BLM with authority to regulate oil and gas
activities on public lands, but not on Indian lands. The BLM’s
assertion of jurisdiction over tribal lands is an overextension of its
authority and contradicts Congress’s policy of self-determination and
self-governance for tribes.142
137. Waters of the Blackfeet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/Blackfeet-WomenAgainst-Fracking/274135685996920 (last visited Mar. 29, 2013).
138. Blackfeet Anti-Fracking Coalition, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/pages/
Blackfeet-Anti-Fracking-Coalition/256172387736753 (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
139. Tristan Scott, Blackfeet Tribe Signs with Company to Treat, Recycle ‘Fracking’ Water, THE
MISSOULIAN
(Mar.
27,
2012
9:30
PM),
http://missoulian.com/news/state-andregional/blackfeet-tribe-signs-with-company-to-treat-recycle-fracking-water/article_30a264747880-11e1-8065-0019bb2963f4.html.
140. Indian Tribal Leaders Raise Concerns About Lack of BLM Consultation with Tribes During
NAT’L
RES.
COMM.
(Apr.
19,
2012),
Hydraulic
Fracturing
Rulemaking,
http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=291083.
141. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701–82 (1976).
142. Fredericks & Aseff, supra note 22, at 123–24.
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It does not make sense to impose more federal regulations and
more bureaucracy when congressional policy has favored greater
tribal control. Throughout the twentieth century, Congress has
continuously expanded tribal control over energy resources. 143 By
eliminating the Secretarial approval for energy development, ITEDSA
and the proposed ITEDSA Amendments take away some control that
the Secretary of the Interior had over leasing on tribal lands. While
there has not been a challenge to ITEDSA, it is likely that courts will
hold it more comparable to the coal leasing statutes in Mitchell
because like the coal leasing statutes in that case, ITEDSA does not
have elaborate control over natural resources. Thus, the United
States likely has no affirmative duty to manage fracking to the
benefit of the tribes and thus, tribes can manage it on their own.
Congress’s intent to increase self-governance was blatantly
disregarded in the rulemaking process. Tribes were inadequately
consulted in the proposed BLM rulemaking process, violating federal
statutes that mandate their participation in such decisions. 144 The
BLM recognized that it needed to consult with Indian tribes,
although its efforts were minimal. The agency held four tribal
consultation meetings, inviting over 175 tribes. 145 Twenty-four
tribes ended up attending the meetings, and most tribal officials
dismissed them as “mere ‘informational sessions’ that didn’t give
them a chance to contribute to the rulemaking.” 146 Response from
tribes has been overwhelmingly negative during the two comment
periods allotted to evaluating the proposed rule and at congressional
hearings. At a congressional hearing in front of the House Natural
Resource Committee’s Subcommittee on Indian and Alaska Native
Affairs, every native tribe testified that they do not want the
proposed rule to apply to their lands. 147 The BLM representatives at
one point left the room while Indian tribes testified on the impacts
143. Tanana & Ruple, supra note 29, at 35.
144. Ellen M. Gilmer, Hydraulic Fracturing: Tribes Push for More Consultation on BLM Rule,
MHA
NEWS
(June
26,
2012),
http://www.mhanation.com/main2/Home_News/
Home_News_2012/News_2012_06_June/news_2012_june26.html.
145. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, OIL AND GAS; HYDRAULIC FRACTURING ON FEDERAL AND INDIAN
LANDS, available at

http://www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/wo/Communications_Directorate/
public_affairs/hydraulicfracturing.Par.91723.File.tmp/HydFrac_SupProposal.pdf.
146. Gilmer, supra note 144.
147. Don Yong, Rep. Young Speaking in Support of His Fracking Amendment, YOUTUBE.COM
(May 16, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwcLLsjEDCw.
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of the rule on their energy development. 148 But the issues raised by
the tribes in absence of BLM representatives were important; for
example, the chairman of the Three Affiliated Tribes, Tex Hall,
argued that the BLM has jurisdiction to regulate activities on public
lands, but not on Indian lands, which are not public lands. 149 He
argued that “[l]ack of consultation equals lack of respect. [The
tribes] are sovereign nations; the actions of these federal agencies
are illegal and disrespectful.” 150 If tribes are hindered from energy
development and blocked from the consultation process, selfdetermination and self-governance are frustrated, completely
undermining congressional intent and preventing federal statutes
such as TERAs from being at all effective.
III. ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS OF FRACKING ON TRIBAL LANDS
A second major reason that tribes must regulate fracking on their
lands is that there is no comprehensive application of environmental
programs on tribal lands. 151 Environmental regulation on tribal
lands is characterized by “ill-defined relationships between tribes,
states, the federal government, and private business” which results
in “jurisdictional uncertainties and . . . overlapping and conflicting
regulatory schemes [which] are counterproductive to sound
environmental regulation and efficient resource and business
development.” 152 This is due to the fact that regulatory power varies
depending on various factors, such as whether the land is owned in
trust or in fee and the status of the tribe involved.153 On most lands,
federal agencies, such as the EPA, end up enforcing environmental
statutes—or rather, trying to enforce them. This Part will begin by
explaining the current regulatory environment. It will then explain
148. Id.
149. Eloise Ogden, Hall Challenges Bureau: Tribal Chairman Questions BLM Authority to
Regulate Fracking on Reservations, MINOT DAILY NEWS, Apr. 21, 2012, available at
http://minotdailynews.com/page/content.detail/id/564963/Hall-challenges-bureau—Tribalchairman-questions-BLM-authority-to-regulate-fracking-on-reservations.html?nav=5010.
150. Ellen M. Gilmer, Hydraulic Fracturing: Tribes Roundly Reject Proposed Federal Fracking
Rules, MHA NEWS (May 15, 2012), http://www.mhanation.com/main2/Home_News/
Home_News_2012/News_2012_05_May/news_2012_may15.html.
151. Benjamin A. Kahn, Separate and Unequal: Environmental Regulatory Management on Indian
Reservations, 35 SPG ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 203, 205 (2012).
152. Walter E. Stern, Environmental Regulation on Indian Lands: A Business Perspective, 7 NAT.
RES. & ENV’T 20, 20 (1993).
153. Id.
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the current regulatory system’s shortcomings, and it will argue that
for similar reasons, federal agencies should not be entrusted with
regulating fracking on tribal lands.
Tribes have the authority to create and enforce environmental
law on their lands from their retained sovereign power or from
express delegation in federal environmental statutes. In general, the
federal government has a statutory obligation to delegate authority
to tribes to administer environmental programs on tribal lands. 154
When the statute, such as RCRA, is silent about regulation, tribes
have the authority to regulate the environment on their lands
without restriction, because of their retained sovereign power. 155
Additionally, many federal statutes, such as the SDWA and the
CWA, authorize the EPA to treat tribes as states (“TAS”). For
example, the SDWA provides that a tribe may assume primary
enforcement responsibility for Underground Injection Control, a
system to regulate pollutants by injection wells into underground
water, which forbids the injection of anything that would endanger
drinking water sources. 156 Another example is the CWA, which
provides that tribes may establish Water Quality Standards just like
states. 157
The EPA ends up regulating most of the federal environmental
statutes because most tribes do not qualify for the TAS program. Out
of the 565 federally-recognized tribes, only forty-eight have been
approved for the CWA TAS program. Scholars’ opinions vary for the
reasons for such low numbers, but many have argued that the
management requirements automatically exclude many tribes from
qualifying. 158 According to the SDWA, the tribes are treated as
states only if they are able to prove certain things, such as a
statement describing the capability of the tribe to administer an
effective program and a description of the tribe’s previous
management experience. 159 Similarly, the CWA provides that tribes
are to be treated as states only if they have “a governing body
carrying out substantial governmental duties and powers” and
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Kahn, supra note 151, at 205.
Id. at 215.
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. EPA, 803 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1986).

33 U.S.C. § 1377(a) (2012).
Marren Sanders, Clean Water in Indian Country: The Risks (and Rewards) of Being Treated
in the Same Manner as a State, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 533, 547–48 (2010).
159. 40 C.F.R. § 131.8 (2010).
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“reasonabl[e]. . . capab[ility]. . . [to carry] out the functions to be
exercised.” 160 Thus, if the tribe is poor or has no relevant experience
managing a similar program, they cannot qualify. 161
Even if the tribe is treated like a state, its environmental
regulatory scheme may not be adequate to address cleanup,
inspections, and other issues since federal funding is limited. If the
tribes are able to meet the TAS standard, they get federal funding to
help achieve the ability to regulate environmental programs on their
own. This funding is not always adequate, however. The CAA for
example, excludes tribes from minimum state funding
entitlements, 162 and the SDWA allocates to Indian tribes just five
percent of the amount allocated to states for Underground Injection
Control programs. 163 These discrepancies must be eliminated
because tribal lands are vulnerable to environmental disasters and
because federal agencies cannot effectively regulate.
Tribes that cannot meet TAS requirements cannot regulate
certain environmental risks that result from non-Indian activities on
Indian lands, which lead to environmental disasters on tribal lands.
Lax enforcement of environmental regulations has created a
situation where non-Indian polluters, such as oil and gas operations,
are incentivized to pollute on tribal lands. 164 One example is
wastewater released by oil companies onto lands. The EPA has an
exception for wastewater dumped in western states; if oil companies
can demonstrate that ranchers of wildlife will use the wastewater,
then they can release it on lands. 165 With time, states’ rules became
stricter than the EPA’s, and some have outlawed dumping all
together. 166 However, the Wind River Reservation, controlled by the
EPA, still allows dumping of wastewater on a case-by-case basis. 167
Some of this waste includes chemicals from fracking. The air reeks of
rotten eggs and the water contains toxic chemicals including
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

33 U.S.C. § 1377 (e)(1–3).
Kahn, supra note 151, at 208.
Id. at 220.
Id. at 221.
Roger Romulus Martella Jr., Note, “Not In My State’s Indian Reservation”—A Legislative
Fix to Close an Environmental Law Loophole, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1863, 1865–66 (1994).
165. Elizabeth Shogren, Loophole Lets Toxic Oil Water Flow Over Indian Land, NPR.ORG
(Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.npr.org/2012/11/15/164688735/loophole-lets-toxic-oil-waterflow-over-indian-land.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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carcinogens and radioactive materials. 168 While in most of the
country, oil companies would re-inject this water underground
where it cannot cause harm, on the reservation there is no incentive
to do so, and thus, native people are suffering the consequences. 169
Wes Martel, of the Eastern Shoshone tribe, argued that the only
solution is for tribes to step in and take charge of their oil fields,
which would help them make all available profits, not just royalties,
and better allow them to protect water quality for future
generations. 170
The EPA’s limited resources have prevented it from being an
effective regulator of tribal lands. For example, more than half of all
facilities on tribal lands that were granted a CAA emissions permit
“appear to have never been inspected.” 171 There is no reason to
expect the BLM’s proposed regulation of fracking on Indian lands to
be any different. For example, in New Mexico, the BLM oversees
more than 30,000 active wells but only has sixty-nine inspectors. 172
If the agency is indeed understaffed and unable to enforce its
policies, and if there is no corresponding regulation by the tribe
which lacks funding, then there will be no efficient fracking
regulation at all.
This is most likely a violation of the federal government’s
obligations to tribes. The trust relationship obligates the government
to protect the health and welfare of Indian people. 173 Courts have
also suggested that there even might be an implied right to
environmentally safe reservation land. 174 For example, the EPA and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs have a duty to help clean contamination
caused from fourteen dump sites located on the Pine Ridge

168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Native Americans and the Environment, ENV’T, HEALTH, & SAFETY ONLINE,
http://www.ehso.com/ehshome/Native%20Americans%20and%20the%20Environment.htm
(last visited Nov. 28, 2012).
172. Lena Groeger, 40 Acres and a Rule: Draft Federal Fracking Regs Cover Only a Sliver of
Land, PROPUBLICA (May 8, 2012, 10:04 AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/40-acres-and-arule-draft-federal-fracking-regs-cover-only-a-sliver-of-land.
173. Kahn, supra note 151, at 211.
174. Id.
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Reservation. 175 Agencies are required to enforce environmental
statutes consistent with their trust obligation to tribes, and when
there is a violation, they must take affirmative steps to remedy the
problem, even when others contributed to it, and even when
environmental statutes do not clearly set forth their obligations. 176
Instead of throwing more responsibility to agencies like the EPA
and BLM, the federal government should empower tribes to regulate
environmental statutes—and thus, fracking—on their own. Granted,
it will not be easy for the tribes to develop a “comprehensive
environmental regulatory code that would cover its air shed, its
waters, its wildlife, as well as its traditional cultural resources.” 177
Therefore, the federal government must assist tribes with financial
and administrative support to strengthen their ability to create and
enforce their own environmental laws because this will further
congressional policies of self-determination and self-governance. It
will give the tribes the ability to regulate the environment at the
level they find appropriate.
This is not a radical proposal. The EPA itself affirms in its Indian
Policy that the agency should “take affirmative steps to encourage
and assist tribes in assuming regulatory and program management
responsibilities for reservation lands.” 178 Congress has also
recognized that tribal sovereignty means increased control over
resources. ITEDSA provides for TERAs, and most environmental
statutes provide for TAS provisions, which all purport to give tribes
more responsibility for their environmental laws.
Agencies must make it a priority to support tribes in attaining
TERA and TAS. While the proposed ITEDSA amendments may help
more tribes achieve the ability to obtain TERA, it is still uncertain
whether it will be passed into law. In the meantime, the federal
government should not attempt to regulate fracking on tribal lands.
It must give tribes more funding to reach TAS standards, so that
they will be eligible for the same funding programs given to states in
175. Id. (citing Blue Legs v. U.S. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 867 F.2d 1094, 1101 (8th Cir.
1989)).
176. Id.
177. Raymond Cross, Development’s Victim or its Beneficiary?: The Impact of Oil and Gas
Development on the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, 87 N.D. L. REV. 535, 554 (2011).
178. Kahn, supra note 151, at 217 (quoting William D. Ruckelhaus, EPA Policy for the
Implementation of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (Nov. 8, 1984), available at
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/community/relocation/policy.htm).
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statutes such as the CAA and SDWA. If tribes are empowered to
develop their own environmental laws, they will be equipped to
address new challenges brought on by emerging technologies, such
as the combination of fracking and horizontal drilling, based on the
tribal land’s unique geological composition. Only with greater
authority over their energy development will Congress’s goals of
increasing tribal sovereignty be truly achieved.
IV. RELIGIOUS CONSIDERATIONS OF FRACKING ON TRIBAL LANDS
Tribes should regulate fracking for a third and final reason. Many
tribes believe that land is sacred, and since fracking involves an
intrusion on the land, tribes are best equipped to understand the
religious implications of such actions. The lands in question may be
more than just lands 179—they may be sacred sites with religious
significance. 180 Many Indian religions hold that “certain geographical
sites or physical formations . . . are held to be “sacred” as an
integral part of the religion.” 181 The relationship to sacred lands can
be misunderstood. Religious exercises at sacred sites are not simply
about obtaining a “spiritual peace of mind”; their importance is
“more about the continuing existence of Indians as a tribal
people.” 182 There are different reasons why places may be holy; they
may contain specific plants, they may be the dwelling place of
spiritual beings, or they may contain burial grounds. 183 In general,

179. See, e.g., Michelle Kay Albert, Obligations and Opportunities to Protect Native American
Sacred Sites Located on Public Lands, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 479 (2009); Erik B. Bluemel,
Accommodating Native American Cultural Activities on Federal Public Lands, 41 IDAHO L. REV. 475
(2005); Peter J. Gardner, The First Amendment’s Unfulfilled Promise in Protecting Native American
Sacred Sites: Is the National Historic Preservation Act a Better Alternative?, 47 S.D. L. REV. 68 (2002);
Samantha M. Ruscavage-Barz, Note, The Efficacy of State Law in Protecting Native American Sacred
Place: A Case Study of the Paseo Del Norte Extension, 47 NAT. RESOURCES J. 969 (2007); Alex
Tallchief Skibine, Towards a Balanced Approach for the Protection of Native American Sacred Sites, 17
MICH. J. RACE & L. 269 (2012).
180. For example, the Blackfeet tribe believes that the Sweet Grass Hills, located within
the Badger-Two Medicine area in Glacier National Park, were made by the Creator and is
the site of vision quests undertaken by teenage boys. Badger-Two Medicine Area, National
NAT’L
TRUST
FOR
HISTORIC
PRES.,
Trust
for
Historic
Preservation,
http://www.preservationnation.org/issues/diversity/native-american-heritage-inpreservation/saved-places/badger-two-medicine-area.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012).
181. Skibine, supra note 179, at 270.
182. Id. at 273.
183. Id. at 274 (citing U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, P.L. 95-341, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS
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the place where an event occurred is more important than the event
itself.184 The concept of sacred lands can be difficult to grasp for
adherents to Western religions where holy places are characterized
by structures instead of the land itself. 185 In Native American
culture, destruction of a sacred site is a “cataclysmic event” because
a deity is vulnerable to changes in its physical habitat. 186
If the BLM regulates fracking, there is a strong likelihood that
sacred sites will be destroyed. While not all tribe members share
beliefs about land (indeed, some, such as Ron Crossguns, 187
emphatically deny these beliefs), tribes should be able to resolve
these matters internally—a fundamental notion under the doctrine
of self-governance. Indian tribes generally have not been successful
arguing for injunctive relief against agencies pursuing development
options on sacred sites. In the seminal case, Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, the United States Forest Service prepared a
final environmental impact statement for the construction of a new
paved road through land that had historically been used by tribes for
religious rituals that depend on an undisturbed natural setting. 188
The Forest Service had found earlier that, to the tribes, the entire
area was significant. 189 Even though the paved road would “interfere
significantly with private persons’ ability to pursue spiritual
fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs,” the individuals
affected would not be coerced by the government action to violate
their religious beliefs.190
In the past, the tribes have benefited from the non-coercion
doctrine. For example, in Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass’n v. Babbitt, the
National Park Service issued a management plan imposing a
voluntary ban on rock-climbing during the culturally significant
month of June on Devil’s Tower National Monument, out of respect
for Indian tribes. 191 The district court and the Tenth Circuit upheld

FREEDOM ACT REPORT 52 (1979)).
184. Sarah B. Gordon, Note, Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public
Lands, 94 YALE L.J. 1447, 1449 (1984–1985).
185. Gardner, supra note 179, at 76.
186. Gordon, supra note 184, at 1449.
187. See supra Part I.
188. 485 U.S. 439, 442 (1988).
189. Id.
190. Id. at 449.
191. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 (D. Wyo. 1998), aff’d 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999).

753

DO NOT DELETE

1/29/2014 4:33 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

2013

the voluntary ban because it was merely an accommodation for
tribes that did not have an impermissible coercive effect on climbers,
who were still allowed meaningful access to the land. 192 However,
more recently, the Ninth Circuit upheld the government’s approval
of the use of artificial snow containing small amounts of human
waste on a mountain for skiing purposes, despite a tribe’s protest
that the use of wastewater snow desecrated the entire mountain, a
sacred site. 193 The court held that the sole effect of the snow would
be to diminish the tribe’s subjective spiritual experience. 194 The
government’s actions did not coerce the tribe to act contrary to their
religious beliefs because they could still access the mountain as
before. 195 Diminution of spiritual fulfillment is not a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion 196—a holding which could be
detrimental to those tribe members trying to protect certain lands
from drilling.
V. CONCLUSION
Fracking on Indian lands brings up pressing issues of tribal
sovereignty, inadequate environmental regulations, and concerns
over harming sacred sites. Tribes are torn between the urgent need
to stimulate their economies and alleviate high poverty rates while
protecting their environment and respecting their sacred lands.
Business Council Co-chairman for the Eastern Shoshone tribe, Wes
Martel, suggests an increased regulatory role for tribes, with “the
main goal . . . not be[ing] how quickly we can get permits
approved but how do we support safe and responsible
development.” 197 The federal government must help tribes acquire
the technical and administrative expertise to develop their ability to
address these issues.198 Indian lands should be exempt from future
BLM regulations, and the federal government should assist tribal

192. Id. at 1455–56.
193. Navajo Nation v. U. S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058, 1063 (9th Cir. 2008).
194. Id. at 1070.
195. Id. at 1070–71.
196. Id. at 1070 n.12.
197. Martin Reed, Tribal Leader Tells Congress of Fracking Worry, THE RANGER (May 8,
2012), http://dailyranger.com/story.php?story_id=1523.
198. Id.
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governments in meeting TAS standards and TERAs and then
ultimately in creating their own fracking regulation that balances
tribes’ environmental, economic, and religious needs.
In response to these concerns, Rep. Don Young (R-AK)
introduced H.R. 3973, the Native American Energy Act, which seeks
to “reduc[e] Federal regulations that impede tribal development of
Indian lands” 199 by giving tribes options to waive appraisals such as
the proposed BLM rule. The bill passed the House Natural Resources
Committee in May 2012.200 This bill is a step in the right direction
of allowing greater tribal control over natural resources decisions.
Tribes in general want to have more control over their resources. For
example, recent oil and gas exploration on the Blackfeet reservation
has led the tribe to obtain TAS standards under the CWA in order to
better protect its rivers, lakes, and wetlands from drilling activity. 201
Tribes that are responsible for their decisions perform better in
terms of economic development. 202 A study of tribes taking control
over forest management, which is somewhat analogous to energy
development because it involves natural resources, demonstrates
that tribes excel when they are allowed to exercise greater discretion
and decision-making authority. 203 The tribal attorney for the
Southern Ute Indian Tribal Chairman stated:
The Southern Ute Tribe believes . . . that Congress should be
concerned with whether or not the tribes are capable of making
informed decisions in the first place and if they are capable of
making those informed decisions, they should take the
responsibility for their mistakes as well as for their good
decisions. 204

199. H.R.
3973,
112th
Cong.,
2d
Sess.
(2012),
available
at
http://beta.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/3973/text.
200. Native
American
Energy
Act
(H.R.3973),
NATURAL
RES.
COMM.,
http://naturalresources.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=296902
(last
visited Nov. 30, 2012).
201. Tristan Scott, Blackfeet to Apply Federal Water Standards as Oil, Gas Exploration Increases,
THE MISSOULIAN (May 5, 2012), http://missoulian.com/news/local/blackfeet-to-apply-federalwater-standards-as-oil-gas-exploration/article_003d256a-965a-11e1-a860-001a4bcf887a.html.
202. Kronk, supra note 5, at 851.
203. Id. at 852.
204. Id. at 831.
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If Secretarial approval for leases was not needed, tribes would be
able to require oil and gas companies to assess the impact that
exploration and drilling would have on sacred sites, for instance.
This is nothing unique; environmental assessments typically require
companies to do so already. The only difference would be that tribes
would be more empowered to prohibit non-compatible uses, 205
especially since courts have been unsympathetic to banning activities
that only affect subjective spiritual experiences. 206 This is not to say
that the current environmental assessment process cannot achieve
results in favor of protection of sacred sites 207 but that tribes face an
uphill, uncertain battle when doing so, and they often lose, especially
on procedural grounds. 208 If tribes had control over their energy
resources, they would be able to regulate their lands as they saw
fit—which is aligned with the policies of self-determination and selfgovernance.
The federal government may be hesitant to surrender too much
control over energy resources on tribal lands, but in doing so, it will
increase energy production in the country as a whole. While North
205. Albert, supra note 179, at 479.
206. See supra Part IV.
207. Perhaps the most famous example in the West of tribal interests prevailing in the
protection of sacred spaces is the Weatherman Draw case from central Montana. See LYUBA
ZARSKY, IS NOTHING SACRED? CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE PROTECTION OF NATIVE
AMERICAN SACRED SITES 26–30 (2006), available at http://www.sacredland.org/PDFs/csr_dl.pdf.
Anschutz Exploration Corporation planned to drill and improve a road that passed through land
considered sacred. Id. at 28. The noisy traffic, oil workers, and increased non-native access would
disturb the power of the spirits, bring harm to natives and non-natives alike, and would destroy
petroglyphs in the area that would inevitably be the victim of vandalism. Id. The BLM approved
the drilling of a single exploratory well in 2001, despite protest from the tribes. Id. Ten tribes
joined together to appeal the decision, questioning whether the BLM had fulfilled its obligation
to adequately consider the project’s cultural impacts. Id. at 29. The BLM upheld Anschutz’s right
to drill for oil, so the tribes appealed the decision to the Department of the Interior, sought
media coverage to bring national attention to the problem, and sought help from Congress,
which introduced a bill to preserve Native American sites. Id. Only then did Anschutz voluntarily
drop its oil-drilling plans and donate the leases to the National Trust for Historic Preservation.
Id. at 30. This case, as positive of an example as it may be, is not typical. There are many
variables: the fact that the tribes were able to get media access, congressional attention, and that
the oil company was in the end willing to give up its leases. It is easy to imagine that a company
with higher stakes would wait until the tribe appealed the administrative decision in federal
district court, which would likely uphold the decision of the BLM.
208. See, e.g., Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone of Nev. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 608 F.3d
592 (9th Cir. 2010); Snoqualmie Indian Tribe v. FERC, 545 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2008); Navajo
Nation v. U.S. Forest Serv., 535 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2008); San Juan Citizens Alliance v. Norton,
586 F. Supp. 2d 1270, 1292 (D. N.M. 2008); Quechan Indian Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian
Reservation v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 547 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (D. Ariz. 2008).
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Dakota and other states sitting on top of shale formations have seen
oil production increase by 500% since President Obama took office,
the Obama Administration’s red-tape and burdensome regulations
have made it impossible for similar energy production on federal or
Indian lands. 209 President Obama himself aims to decrease
America’s dependence on foreign oil, and tribal lands hold a
significant amount of resources that can be used to achieve that goal.
The longer such regulations are allowed to hold up development of
American onshore natural resources on tribal lands, the longer oilrich tribes will be trapped in a cycle of poverty, unemployment, and
hopelessness—and the further the nation will be in achieving
President Obama’s own goals of increasing American energy
independence.
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